Semcon IP v. Amazon.com, Inc.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claim Construction L

The Parties’ Positions

Plaintiff submits: The Court in Huawei held that the meaning of “permitted power consumption” of “determining a level of permitted power consumption” was reasonably certain. The issue here is the same as that before the Court in Huawei. The permitted power consumption level, the level of permitted power consumption, is known to those of skill in the art to be a function of device parameters and operational circumstances. Dkt. No. 48 at 24–25.

In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following extrinsic evidence to support its position: Carbonell Decl. ¶¶ 70–71 (Plaintiff’s Ex. E, Dkt. No. 48-6 at 27–28).

Defendant responds: The Asserted Patents provide no guidance regarding what makes a particular power level permitted or not and “level of permitted power” is not a term of art with definite meaning. Further, there is no indication in the patents that the operating levels specified in a product data sheet establishes what is or is not a “level or permitted power.” Rather, the patents teach that it is possible to run the processor outside the specified levels. Thus, there is no way to determine whether any particular level is a “level of permitted power.” Dkt. No. 50 at 30–31.

In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position: Intrinsic evidence: ’708 Patent col.7 ll.32–52. Extrinsic evidence: Thornton Decl. ¶¶ 93–94 (Defendant’s Ex. H, Dkt. No. 50-9 at 37).

Plaintiff replies: Defendant’s position fails to account for the information available to persons of ordinary skill in the art; namely, product data sheets. In the context of this information, what constitutes a “level of permitted power” is reasonably certain. Dkt. No. 53 at 13.

Plaintiff cites further extrinsic evidence to support its position: Carbonell Decl. ¶¶ 69–72 (Plaintiff’s Ex. E, Dkt. No. 48-6 at 27–28).

Analysis

The issue is whether the meaning of “level of permitted power” of a processor is reasonably certain to one of ordinary skill in the art. It is.

This is substantially the same issue as addressed by the Court in Huawei. There, the Court held that the meaning of “determining the level of permitted power consumption” in Claim 1 of the ’247 Patent is reasonably certain. Huawei, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108040, at *31–34. For the reasons set forth in Huawei, the Court reiterates that the meaning of this term in the context of Claim 1 of the ’247 Patent is reasonably certain.

Accordingly, Defendant has failed to prove that any claim is indefinite for including “level of permitted power.” The Court hereby holds that the term “level of permitted power” has its plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.

Case No. 2:18-cv-00192

Semcon IP v. Amazon.com, Inc.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claim Construction K

The Parties’ Positions

Plaintiff submits: The term “safe level,” in the context of the processor temperature, plainly means the maximum temperature level provided in published standards and specifications sheets for a processor. Dkt. No. 48 at 23–24.

In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position: Intrinsic evidence: ’708 Patent col.7 ll.37–41. Extrinsic evidence: Carbonell Decl. ¶ 67 (Plaintiff’s Ex. E, Dkt. No. 48-6 at 26–27).

Defendant responds: The Asserted Patents provide no guidance regarding what makes a particular level safe and “safe level” is not a term of art with definite meaning. Further, there is no indication in the patents that the operating levels specified in a product data sheet establishes what is or is not a “safe level.” Rather, the patents teach that it is possible to run the processor outside the specified levels, so long as the temperature stays below a “safe level.” Thus, there is no way to determine whether any particular level is a “safe level.” Dkt. No. 50 at 28–30.

In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position: Intrinsic evidence: ’708 Patent col.7 ll.32–52. Extrinsic evidence: Thornton Decl. ¶ 91 (Defendant’s Ex. H, Dkt. No. 50-9 at 36–37).

Plaintiff replies: Defendant’s position fails to account for the information available to persons of ordinary skill in the art; namely, product data sheets. In the context of this information, what constitutes a “safe level” is reasonably certain. Dkt. No. 53 at 12–13.

Plaintiff cites further extrinsic evidence to support its position: Carbonell Decl. ¶¶ 66–68 (Plaintiff’s Ex. E, Dkt. No. 48-6 at 25–27).

Analysis

The issue is whether the meaning of “safe level” for a processor’s temperature is reasonably certain to one of ordinary skill in the art. It is.

The meaning of the “safe level” of Claims 30, 32, 42, 44, 48, and 50 of the ’708 Patent is reasonably certain. The Asserted Patents provide:

• It should be noted that at some point during the monitoring operation it may be found that the processor is functioning at a normal frequency and voltage, that the temperature of operation is below some preselected value, and that a series of processor-intensive commands have been furnished to be executed by the processor. In such a case, these characteristics suggest that it may be desirable to increase the voltage and frequency of operation in order to handle these commands for a period less than would raise operating temperatures beyond a safe level. In such a case, the control software may compute higher frequency and voltage values and a temperature (or a time within which temperature will not increase beyond a selected level) in order to cause the hardware to move to this higher frequency state of operation. In such a case, the processor executing the process illustrated effectively ramps up the frequency and voltage so that the processor “sprints” for a short time to accomplish the desired operations. This has the effect of allowing a processor which nominally runs at a lower frequency to attain operational rates reached by more powerful processors during those times when such rates are advantageous.

’061 Patent col.7 ll.40–61.

It is possible to clear a back-log of commands by increasing the processor’s operating frequency (its core clock) for a period of time. It is important, however, to keep the temperature of operation at a “safe level.” One of ordinary skill in the art would read this disclosure with the knowledge that processors are designed to be functional below a certain temperature. See Carbonell Decl. ¶ 67, Dkt. No. 48-6 at 26–27. Processor manufacturers provide the temperature beyond which the processor may no longer be operable. Id. With this context, it is reasonably certain that “safe level” refers to the temperature beyond which the processor may not function properly. Going beyond that level poses a risk that the processor will not function properly and defeat the purpose of increasing the frequency.

The claims involving a “safe level” of temperature parallel and are informed by the above-quoted overclocking description from the patent. For example, Claim 30 of the ’708 Patent depends from a series of claims related to increasing the processor frequency and voltage (Claim 27) for a period of time (Claim 28) less than required for temperature to increase beyond a “safe level” (Claims 29, 30). This closely parallels the overclocking disclosure in the patent. “Safe level” should be interpreted in the context of this disclosure and with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and thus its meaning is reasonably certain.

Accordingly, Defendant has not proven any claim is indefinite for inclusion of the term “safe level.” The Court hereby construes “safe level” to mean “maximum operable temperature.”

Case No. 2:18-cv-00192

Semcon IP v. Amazon.com, Inc.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claim Construction J

The Parties’ Positions

Plaintiff submits: Defendant’s indefiniteness position is premised on the Asserted Patents having to provide how the recited determinations are made. This is an issue of enablement, not definiteness. Dkt. No. 48 at 13–14.

In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiff cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position: Intrinsic evidence: ’061 Patent col.1 ll.42–45, col.5 ll.63–66. Extrinsic evidence: Thornton Decl. ¶¶ 46–48 (Plaintiff’s Ex. F, Dkt. No. 48-7 at 18–19); Carbonell Decl. ¶¶ 37–41 (Plaintiff’s Ex. E, Dkt. No. 48-6 at 15–18).

Defendant responds: “Determining” the parameters stated in the claims may cover “a variety of activities” and neither the claims nor the rest of the specification of the Asserted Patents provide guidance regarding what activities are within the scope of determining in the claims. For the meanings of the Determining Terms to be clear, the claims or the technical disclosure must provide either an input or output and also “the process or algorithm for how the actual determining is made.” The patents, however, “fail to disclose any techniques for determining” the recited parameters. Thus, the meanings of the Determining Terms are not reasonably clear. Dkt. No. 50 at 25–28.

In addition to the claims themselves, Defendant cites the following intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support its position: Intrinsic evidence: ’061 Patent col.3 ll.49–52, col.4 ll.12–20. Extrinsic evidence: Thornton Decl. ¶¶ 46–56 (Defendant’s Ex. H, Dkt. No. 50-9 at 18–23).

Plaintiff replies: The issue of whether the Asserted Patents disclose any techniques for determining a recited parameter is not an issue of claim construction. Rather, this is an issue of enablement. In any event, the patents disclose using a look-up table to determine frequency. Dkt. No. 53 at 5–6.

Plaintiff cites further intrinsic evidence to support its position: ’061 Patent col.5 ll.23–28, col.5 ll.63–67.

Analysis

The issue is whether the Asserted Patents must provide algorithms for the various “determining” functions recited in the claims for the claims to be definite. They do not.

The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that for a claim including functional language to be definite, the functional language must be supported by descriptions of algorithms for how the function is performed. While this may be true when 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies, Defendant provides no legal support for this as a rule separate from § 112, ¶ 6 and does not directly argue that § 112, ¶ 6 applies to the Determining Terms. Thus, whether the “determining” language is supported by the written description is determined under the enablement or written-description statutory requirements, it is not an issue of claim construction.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Defendant has not proven any claim indefinite by reason of including “determining” in the claim language and holds that the Determining Terms have their plain and ordinary meaning without the need for further construction.

Case No. 2:18-cv-00192